Delivering on Raul’s Promises

      Brian Latell

Raul Castro has delivered only a few major speeches during the twenty-one months since he took the reigns of power, a period of time in which his brother would typically have emitted a hundred or more. Public performance has never been Raul’s forte. Despite decades of trying to improve his delivery, his oratory still falls flat. He rarely says anything inspiring or unrehearsed. As in his inaugural address on becoming Cuba’s new president on February 24, he almost always reads methodically from a script.

     But surprisingly, what seemed for so long to be a deficiency that could undermine his ability to govern in his own right turns out to be a critical asset. Cubans are relieved they are no longer required to listen to interminable speeches, especially if, as so often in the past, they had to stand under a blazing sun for hours at a time. They appreciate that they are not being imposed on or hectored, as they were, by a leader obviously unsympathetic to their daily plight. And they are grateful now not to be summoned to march in manifestations of revolutionary fervor for causes that have no bearing on their real needs.

     In part Raul’s leadership style is calculated to enhance his popularity by contrasting himself favorably with his brother. Raul knows he was feared and despised by many Cubans who remembered vividly his part in brutal executions and repression, and has therefore been intent on improving his standing. Since a long article (La Cercanía de Raul), a paean that dramatically contrasted him with Fidel, was published in May, 2006, Raul has increasingly presented himself to the Cuban populace as the un-Fidel.

     He is not contemplating any political opening. But he is elevating popular expectations for economic and social decompression with promises of major structural and conceptual change, and then delivering on them. Cubans are aware too that nearly all of the promises Raul made in his February speech represent significant breaks from fidelista orthodoxy. His brother would not have permitted any of the initiatives Raul has undertaken.

•           Consultation with the Populace. During his early years in power Fidel pretended to consult intimately with the masses. He called it “direct democracy,” but of course it was neither. Raul’s promises to engage the people have been of an entirely different order. On February 24 he said, remarkably, that Cuba has been “permanently opened to free debate.” And then to clarify his intent he added that we must “question everything.” Under Fidel such doubting would have been branded as counterrevolutionary. So I thought that after about five million Cubans engaged in tendentious debates about Cuba’s myriad domestic problems last fall, Raul might retreat from such potentially destabilizing promises. But he made them even more explicit in his most recent speech. “The best solutions,” he said, “can come from a profound exchange of differing opinions.”

•           Easing Hated Official Restrictions. Raul reiterated an earlier promise to “reduce excessive prohibitions and regulations.” Fidel’s preference for what Raul described as “the enormous amounts of meetings, coordination, permissions, conciliations, provisions, rules, and regulations” had caused debilitating inefficiencies, even gridlock. Raul promised that the “most simple of them” would soon be lifted. And a number of potentially significant reforms have been taken or outlined in the two months since his speech, including ones to reduce restrictions on home ownership; sales of computers, DVDs, cell phones, video players, and other appliances; as well as access to hotels previously off-limits to Cubans.

•           Wage and Monetary Reform. The system of dual currencies first introduced by Fidel in 1993 is one of the most alienating and polarizing policies the Revolution ever adopted. Raul promised a “progressive, gradual, and prudent revaluation of the peso” and to delve into the phenomenon of the dual currency.” That cautious language indicates that changes in this area will be among the most difficult to make. But more modest steps have already been announced or presaged. Restrictions that put ceilings on how much wage earners can make are being lifted. Raul also promised “to protect and steadily increase the income and savings of the populace, especially the least favored.”

•           Agricultural Reform. Last July Raul promised major restructuring in the crippled agricultural sector, and a number of changes, whose impact on productivity is not yet apparent, have been announced. Like the early Chinese economic reform model, they seem intended to decentralize planning, management, and marketing of food production while encouraging greater private initiative. Raul has also hinted at the need for foreign investment in agriculture, but has not yet revealed any plans.

•           Changes in Government Institutions and Leadership. On February 24 Raul surprised most observers with the appointment of his alter ego, Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, as first vice president of the Councils of State and Ministers, and therefore first in the line of succession. A few other new faces were added to the Council of State, and it seemed clear that Raul was strengthening the hand of his closest and highest ranking military and communist party associates. But in remarks during that speech that have attracted little attention, he also promised that “the composition of government” will be reevaluated later this year. “Decisions about which changes may be required in institutions” as well as “appointments” will be made. He made clear that his intent is a “more compact” and streamlined system of government institutions. He seemed to hint that capable civilian technocrats would gain influence, probably including a number of representatives of younger generations.

•           Decentralization. Raul signaled too that leadership and institutional changes, now undoubtedly under intense review, will result in much greater decentralization. “Many believe,” erroneously he implied, “that solutions to every problem require a national measure.”

     He provided no specifics about the kind of restructuring he no doubt has in mind, or about who in the current leadership may rise or fall in the reshuffling that will probably start to be unveiled in the next few months. Once all that is accomplished, the true composition of Raul’s regime will be revealed. Certainly, some familiar faces in the highest ranks of the civilian bureaucracy will be elevated or given substantial new responsibilities, and some others, closer in the past to Fidel than to Raul, will be eclipsed. And surely by then, anyone who may still believe that Raul Castro is not actually calling the shots in Cuba ought to understand that a new era has begun.

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I wish to acknowledge the valuable assistance provided by Vanessa Lopez, my University of Miami student research assistant, in the preparation of this report.

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Dr. Brian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and recent author of the book, After Fidel: The Inside Story of Castro’s Regime and Cuba’s Next Leader, is a Senior Research Associate at ICCAS. He has informed American and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and Fidel Castro in a number of capacities. He served in the early 1990s as National Intelligence Officer for Latin America at the Central Intelligence Agency and taught at Georgetown University for a quarter century. Dr. Latell has written, lectured, and consulted extensively.