Cuba's Generation Gap

                                                                                                                                                                   BRIAN LATELL


After waiting his turn for nearly 50 years, Raul Castro traded in his military uniform for a tailored suit and became Cuba's new president on Feb. 24. His brief inaugural address was filled with obsequies to his ailing brother Fidel, along with promises to consult him about important decisions. But the reality is that 76-year-old Raul is now firmly in charge. Fidel's long reign is over.

There is even reason to believe the brothers' relationship had turned acrimonious, and that Fidel was forced into retirement. One indication: During his interregnum following Fidel's provisional cession of power in July, 2006, Raul never benefited from public words of encouragement or support from his brother.


In over 90 ruminations issued by Fidel in the Cuban media over the last year, Raul was only mentioned once. In contrast, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was repeatedly glorified, once even referred to by Fidel as his "brother."

There's another indication that all is not well between the two. Upon taking command, Raul demonstrated his independence, naming an alter ego as first vice president of the governing council of state -- the same post, first in the line of succession, that Raul had occupied himself for decades. Cuba's new heir-apparent is the obscure Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, a 77-year-old Communist Party apparatchik who frequently clashed with Fidel in the past. He served as a medical doctor in Raul's guerrilla force in the late 1950s and has enjoyed his support and protection ever since.

Raul's overriding priority is to secure his position by surrounding himself with trusted, tough, old veterans who, if necessary, could mobilize whatever firepower needed to defend the new regime against popular unrest or a home-brewed cabal. The latter is unlikely, but Raul may fear that some aggrieved officials, still fanatically loyal to Fidel, might make trouble.

Thus, among the others now prominent in the inner circle are Cuba's four most powerful military officers -- the new defense minister, the interior minister who runs the country's intelligence and security agencies, the military chief of staff and the commander of the strategically located western army in Havana. All three-star generals, they all began their careers decades ago at Raul's side and are devoted loyalists.

Raul's second priority runs parallel to his first. The elevation of the disciplinarian Mr. Machado signals his plan to strengthen the party. On his very first day in power, Raul stressed the need for order, discipline and unity. He will now depend on his old friend to take the lead in restructuring and reducing the number of government ministries and agencies, with the intent of making them more efficient and responsive to popular needs. In the process, additional leadership changes will be revealed.

However, Raul's strategy runs up against a problem: None of his appointments appeal to the Cuban people. The country's two-and-a half million youth who were born or came of age after the collapse of the economy in the early 1990s are the most aggrieved and restless.

The number and intensity of incidents reflecting their dissatisfaction has reached unprecedented levels. Recently, for example, two university students appeared in a video, probably leaked by disgruntled government functionaries. It showed the youths vociferously complaining to the startled president of the national assembly.

Ironically, this generational unrest is due in large measure to Raul's earlier injunction to university students to debate Cuba's problems "fearlessly." He knows of course that Fidel would never have opened himself to such criticism, but continues to gamble that the grievances of Cuban youth can be assuaged. In his recent speech he said that Cuba "has been permanently opened to debate," although he prudently insisted on the "importance of discipline."

Raul is raising popular hopes by promising to decentralize the economy. He will likely begin by introducing limited market mechanisms in agriculture. The hated dual currency system that divides Cubans into relatively rich and miserably poor is under review. Intellectuals, artists and others are being allowed greater freedom of expression. But there are no plans to loosen the tightly controlled political system or relax the brutal repression of dissidents.

Many observers had believed the limited decompression, and the popular hopes it has elevated, would have been matched by a rejuvenation in senior leadership ranks. Perhaps, for example, vice president Carlos Lage, a 56-year-old civilian economic planner known to favor economic reforms, would become Raul's heir apparent. But he was passed over, and no other leaders of his middle generation were promoted either.

Now it is all too obvious that the new regime is led by a dull and tired gerontocracy. There is not a charismatic or appealing figure among them. Most, like Mr. Machado and the generals, have toiled in the background and are rarely seen in public or the media. The average age of Raul and his six vice presidents is over 70. With few exceptions, the experiences of these elderly men (there are no women in the senior nomenklatura) have mainly consisted of saluting and marching to the orders of the Castro brothers.

There are acute dangers in this new situation. By refusing to begin legitimizing a younger generation of successors, Raul has probably further alienated mid-level officials, civilian and military, who see their chances of advancement blocked by his cronies. Together with the already alienated youth, they constitute a large segment of the population, and could become a potentially destabilizing force.

Raul's health is a state secret, but after decades of heavy drinking he probably suffers from serious afflictions. So by putting Mr. Machado next in line,he may be inviting an eventual succession crisis.

That old party commissar has no credibility with the populace, and to the extent he has any public image at all, it is as a tough, impatient enforcer. If he were required to step in after Raul, he would inevitably preside over a military-dominated regime that would enjoy no public support. Its prospects for preserving stability without inflicting terrible violence on civilians might be poor.

Then there is Fidel, gravely handicapped and now about to begin his 20th month out of sight, in his sickbed. But he can probably still cause problems for Raul, whose ability to manage crises is untested.

Raul must know he is playing with fire as he simultaneously tries to allow some decompression, while relying on hard-line cronies. But he has concluded he has no choice because of the disastrously failed economy and generational discord he inherited. So, amid the first puffs of protest and latent instability, Cuba's new leadership will strain to move the country forward without generating truly destabilizing crises.